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INTRODUCTION 
The work-product doctrine was first recognized by the Supreme Court 
in 19471 and was adopted in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1970.2  
In the recent case United States v. Textron Inc.,3 however, an en banc First 
Circuit panel ruled that tax accrual workpapers are not protected work 
product and, in so doing, effectively created a new rule for determining 
which documents the doctrine protects.  The dissent warned that the “bad 
 
*  J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; B. Com., University of McGill, 2006.  My 
thanks go to my advisor, Professor Ronald Allen, for his insights.  My sincere thanks to Jonathan Shaub, 
Laura Baca, Mark Berghausen, and Jessica Bevis for their editorial comments.  Thank you also to 
Kendra Stead and Rachel Sifuentes for their guidance on early drafts of this Note.  Finally, a special 
thanks to my family for their love and support.  
1  See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509–10 (1947). 
2  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) & advisory committee’s note. 
3  United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
3320 (2010). 
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rule” issued in Textron would throw the “law of work-product protection 
into disarray.”4 
Echoing the dissent’s alarm, commentators immediately sounded the 
death knell for the work-product doctrine, and many question what remains.  
One commentator remarked that “the entire legal profession and all 
corporations should be in a state of disbelief.”5  Yet despite eleven amicus 
briefs filed in support,6 the Supreme Court recently denied a petition for 
certiorari in Textron,7 leaving the matter to the circuit courts. 
The case arose because Textron, an aerospace and defense 
conglomerate, refused to comply with the IRS’s demand that it turn over 
documents related to its 1998–2001 tax returns.8  These workpapers 
included a spreadsheet that consisted of the following: 
(a) lists of items on Textron’s tax returns, which, in the opinion of Textron’s 
counsel, involve[d] issues on which the tax laws are unclear, and, therefore, 
may be challenged by the IRS;  
(b) estimates by Textron’s counsel expressing, in percentage terms, their 
judgments regarding Textron’s chances of prevailing in any litigation over 
those issues (the “hazards of litigation percentages”); and 
(c) the dollar amounts reserved to reflect the possibility that Textron might not 
prevail in such litigation (the “tax reserve amounts”).9 
The IRS also requested the notes and memoranda drafted by in-house 
attorneys that supported the above information, including the analysis of 
which items to include on the spreadsheets and the “hazard percentage” to 
be applied to each item.10  These documents are referred to collectively as 
“tax accrual workpapers.”11 
The IRS, pursuant to its power to determine “the accuracy of any 
return, [by] ‘examin[ing] any books, papers, records, or other data which 
may be relevant or material to such inquiry,’”12 issued Textron a summons 
seeking these documents.  Textron refused to provide the workpapers, and 
the IRS brought a suit in federal district court.13  Agreeing with Textron’s 
 
4  Id. at 34, 43 (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
5  Michelle M. Henkel, Textron Eviscerates the 60-Year-Old Work Product Privilege, 125 TAX 
NOTES 237, 237 (2009).  Henkel also noted that the “whole adversarial system would be undermined” if 
the ruling was “left to stand.”  Id. at 242.  
6  Paul L. Caron, Textron Amicus Briefs, TAXPROF BLOG (Jan. 28, 2010), http://taxprof.
typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2010/01/textron.html. 
7  Textron, 130 S. Ct. 3320. 
8  Textron, 577 F.3d at 23–24. 
9  Id. at 38 (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
10  United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 143 (D.R.I. 2007), rev’d en banc, 577 F.3d 21 
(1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3320. 
11  See id. at 142 (noting the lack of an immutable definition of the term “tax accrual workpapers”). 
12  Textron, 577 F.3d at 24 (quoting I.R.C. § 7602 (2006)). 
13  Id. at 23–24. 
105:919  (2011) Tax Accrual Workpapers and Textron 
 921 
claims that the documents were protected by the work-product doctrine,14 
the district court ruled in Textron’s favor.15 
The IRS appealed the ruling to the First Circuit, and a three-judge 
panel initially upheld the lower court ruling.16  However, an en banc panel 
vacated that opinion and issued a 3–2 opinion in favor of the IRS.  The en 
banc panel held that Textron’s tax accrual workpapers were not prepared in 
anticipation of litigation, giving little weight to the fact that the prospect of 
litigation motivated the creation of the documents.17  In fact, Textron 
prepared the documents for two reasons: first, to prepare for possible tax 
litigation and, second, to ensure auditor approval of its financial 
statements.18 
Textron highlights the inadequacies of current judicial tests for 
determining whether documents are prepared “in anticipation of litigation.”  
It also adds a new wrinkle to the current circuit split over the definition of 
the phrase.19  Because of this lack of clarity and uniformity in the rules 
governing work product, the Textron opinion may cause courts to narrowly 
construe the scope of the doctrine’s protection.  Importantly, many worry 
that the narrow reading of the work-product doctrine in this context will 
also weaken protection for corporate documents outside of the tax setting.20  
Thus, the Textron decision has sparked vigorous legal debate.21 
 
14  See generally United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982) (“It is settled, of 
course, that a work product defense may be asserted against enforcement of an IRS summons.” (citing 
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981))). 
15  Textron, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 141.  Textron also asserted that the summons lacked a legitimate 
purpose and claimed that the workpapers were protected under the attorney–client and tax practitioner 
privileges.  These claims were not at issue on appeal.  Textron, 577 F.3d at 24–25. 
16  Textron, 577 F.3d at 26. 
17  Id. at 31–32. 
18  See infra Part III.A. 
19  See infra text accompanying notes 67–69. 
20  David E. Frank, Attorneys Predicting ‘Upheaval’ in Wake of Work-Product Ruling, MASS. LAW. 
WKLY., Aug. 24, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 16691200 (“[T]he court’s ruling will undoubtedly 
apply to most work-product disputes in federal court.”).  Further, any change in federal law will affect 
work-product rulings in both state and federal courts.  See Pyramid Controls, Inc. v. Siemens Indus. 
Automations, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 269, 276 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (noting that federal law governs issues 
concerning work-product doctrine in diversity cases). 
21  For example, Reed Smith LLP uncharacteristically filed an amicus brief on its own behalf to 
make clear to the Supreme Court that “this is not just an academic dispute.”  Tony Mauro, Reed Smith 
Gets Personal in the Work-Product Debate Before Supreme Court, NAT’L L.J. (Jan. 28, 2010), http://
www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202439567356&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1; see also Brief for Reed 
Smith LLP et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Textron Inc. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3320 
(2010) (No. 09-750), 2010 WL 342153.  The partner representing Textron welcomed Reed Smith’s brief 
as well as briefs submitted by the American Bar Association, the Association of Corporate Counsel, and 
the Defense Resources Institute, stating, “This is a case that has attracted enormous attention and is of 
obvious importance to lawyers.”  Id.; see also Charles L. Steel, IV & Matthew C. Marshall, U.S. v. 
Deloitte: Tax Accrual Workpapers Can Contain Attorney Work Product, WILLIAMS MULLEN TAX LAW 
ALERT (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.williamsmullen.com/files/Publication/e6fa18fd-2181-4e4c-aa5d-
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This Note argues that Textron allowed policy considerations to affect 
the outcome of the case without directly analyzing the competing objectives 
of the privilege.  The work-product doctrine, like all privileges, attempts to 
strike a balance between enforcement and privacy, and the Textron decision 
was guided by the court’s desire to balance effective tax law enforcement 
by the IRS against the need for privacy to conduct detailed legal analysis of 
tax filings by corporate entities.  Regardless of which objective one finds 
more important, the majority properly brought the policy discussion into the 
opinion.  The majority failed, however, to explicitly balance these two 
objectives and to set out a framework for lower courts to follow. 
Part I takes a detailed look at tax accrual workpapers and explains the 
difficulty in applying the work-product doctrine to these documents.  Part II 
discusses the history, background, and theoretical underpinning of the 
work-product doctrine, highlighting the circuit split related to the phrase “in 
anticipation of litigation.”  Part III discusses the Textron holding in depth 
and, using the language and theories from the preceding sections, explains 
how the Textron court erred.  Finally, Part IV argues that while the doctrine 
was applied incorrectly, the eventual outcome in Textron may have been 
correct in light of the policy considerations and practical concerns 
underlying the doctrine. 
The Note concludes by arguing that, despite the alarm it has raised, 
Textron did not drastically change the work-product doctrine.  Courts and 
litigants will be able to limit Textron’s impact by recognizing that the work-
product doctrine requires an explicit balancing between enforcement and 
privacy.  Thus, happily, corporate counsel everywhere can relax their state 
of disbelief. 
I. TAX ACCRUAL WORKPAPERS 
Public corporations prepare audited financial statements each year to 
meet statutory and regulatory requirements and to be eligible to sell 
securities to the public.22  The Securities Act of 1933 requires that 
independent public or certified accountants certify these audits.23  Further, 
to issue a favorable opinion letter for the audit—indicating that the financial 
statements fairly represent the company’s financials—outside auditors 
require the company to review its tax return to determine whether the IRS 
may challenge any positions the company has taken on its tax return.  If 
challenge is possible, the company must estimate its potential liability and 
 
6e632f8921b4/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/fb218834-718f-4b9b-9963-6feb1e84f776/Tax_09-
10-2010_USvDeloitte.pdf (“The question of whether tax accrual workpapers are protected from 
discovery under the work-product doctrine is being hotly debated among the U.S. Courts of Appeals and 
anxiously watched by corporate taxpayers.”).  
22  See Henkel, supra note 5, at 239. 
23  15 U.S.C. § 77aa sched. A(25)–(26) (2006); accord Henkel, supra note 5, at 239. 
105:919  (2011) Tax Accrual Workpapers and Textron 
 923 
accrue reserves accordingly.24  Tax accrual workpapers are prepared by the 
company to calculate such reserves and to provide the support auditors need 
to certify the statements. 
Tax accrual workpapers generally highlight each tax position the 
company has taken that may require paying additional taxes at a later date.25  
Companies take pains to ensure that tax accrual workpapers remain 
confidential because they list positions that are not obviously justified under 
the tax laws and disclose the company’s and its lawyers’ judgments about 
how any dispute over the tax position would be resolved in litigation.26  As 
the Textron court noted, “tax accrual work papers [would] provide a 
resource for the IRS . . . by pinpointing the ‘soft spots’ on a corporation’s 
tax return . . . and providing an item-by-item analysis of the corporation’s 
potential exposure to additional liability.”27 
Historically, the IRS has hesitated to demand the disclosure of tax 
accrual workpapers.28  However, in 2002, after the collapse of Enron and 
other corporate scandals, the IRS changed its policy, announcing that it 
would seek tax accrual workpapers related to “listed transactions” disclosed 
on tax returns.29  Listed transactions are transactions that the IRS has 
identified as tax avoidance transactions.30  Under this new policy, IRS 
examiners must request workpapers for listed transactions claimed on the 
return and must request all tax accrual papers if two or more listed 
transactions are disclosed.31 
 
24  See generally Stuart J. Bassin, Managing Tax Accrual Workpapers After Textron, 123 TAX 
NOTES 571, 572 (2009) (discussing the reasons for tax accrual workpapers). 
25  Published financial statements do not identify specific tax items for which a reserve has been 
calculated but instead reflect only a total reserve number.  United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 23 
(1st Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
26  Robin L. Greenhouse & Michael F. Kelleher, Textron Protects Tax Accrual Workpapers from 
IRS Summons, 117 TAX NOTES 255, 255 (2007). 
27  Textron, 577 F.3d at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
28  Susan Simmonds & Sam Young, Government Loses “Test Case” on Tax Accrual Workpapers, 
116 TAX NOTES 815, 815 (2007) (citing IRM 4.10.20.2(2) (July 12, 2004)).  This policy of not 
demanding tax accrual workpapers was formed after a district court ruled in favor of the IRS in United 
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), enforcing the IRS’s right to summon 
tax workpapers prepared by the taxpayer’s independent auditors.  The ruling was followed by an outcry 
of concern that broad IRS power in this area would diminish the accuracy of financial statements, to 
which the IRS responded by issuing a policy of restraint.  Greenhouse & Kelleher, supra note 26, at 255.  
By the time the case was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1984, it was IRS policy not to seek tax 
accrual workpapers during audits except in unusual circumstances.  Id.  Even under such unusual 
circumstances, e.g., not being able to obtain the necessary information from the taxpayer, the IRS 
examiner was required to obtain written approval from the chief of examination.  Id.  Further, any 
request made was to be limited to only the relevant portion of the workpapers.  Id. 
29  See IRM 4.10.20.3.2 (July 12, 2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-010-
020.html; Simmonds & Young, supra note 28, at 815; see also Textron, 577 F.3d at 23.  
30  Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (2010). 
31  Greenhouse & Kelleher, supra note 26, at 255. 
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Business and financial groups harshly criticized this policy change.  
The Clearing House, an independent association that represents large 
American banks, and the American Bankers Association, a banking trade 
association, issued a joint statement declaring that they “strongly disagree 
with the new policy and believe that the new policy is counterproductive.”32  
The groups argued that the policy would lead the IRS to request tax accrual 
workpapers from taxpayers who should not be subject to such requests, 
would allow the IRS to “abuse and inappropriately alter the balance 
between the IRS and the taxpayer,” and would force the taxpayer to endure 
additional litigation.33  The groups also noted that taxpayers viewed the new 
policy as penalizing taxpayers for participation in listed transactions.34 
An additional change that will undoubtedly affect Textron’s 
implications going forward is the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s 
2006 Interpretation of Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes No. 48, 
commonly referred to as “FIN 48.”35  FIN 48 requires companies, before 
taking a tax position on a filed return, to determine whether the position is 
“more likely than not” to be sustained upon examination by the taxing 
authority.36  By issuing FIN 48, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
sought to foster consistency in the tax positions taken by companies in 
annual returns, but it effectively required companies to complete an 
analysis similar to that found in the tax accrual workpapers when preparing 
financial statements.37 
 
32  Letter from Norman R. Nelson, Gen. Counsel, Clearing House, and Donna J. Fisher, Dir. of Tax 
& Accounting, Am. Bankers Ass’n, to Mark W. Everson, Comm’r, IRS, and Eric Solomon, Acting 
Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of the Treasury 1–2 (July 29, 2005) [hereinafter Letter from Nelson & 
Fisher], available at http://www.theclearinghouse.org/reference/comment_letters/commentLetterDocs/
001114.pdf (regarding the IRS’s policy for requesting tax accrual workpapers). 
33  Id. at 2–3. 
34  Id. 
35  FIN 48 is an interpretation of how to implement certain aspects of Financial Accounting 
Standards Board Statement No. 109 and has recently been incorporated in the new codification of 
standards at Topic 740.  FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 48, 
ACCOUNTING FOR UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAXES (2006), available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/
BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175820931560&
blobheader=application/pdf [hereinafter FIN 48]; FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., NO. 2009-06, 
INCOME TAXES (TOPIC 740): IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE ON ACCOUNTING FOR UNCERTAINTY IN 
INCOME TAXES AND DISCLOSURE AMENDMENTS FOR NONPUBLIC ENTITIES (2009), available at http://
www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=
1175819501289&blobheader=application/pdf [hereinafter 740 UPDATE].  
36   FIN 48, supra note 35, at 2. 
37  FIN 48 governs all material positions taken on income tax returns, including those filed with the 
local, state, and federal authorities.  See 740 UPDATE, supra note 35, at 12. 
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II. THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 
In federal litigation, discovery rules play an essential role in ensuring 
that both parties are aware of all relevant facts before trial.38  Privileges and 
protections, on the other hand, necessarily limit access to the truth.39  When 
the liberal discovery rules and strict privileges come into conflict, as they 
often do, judges must balance the underlying interests and decide to protect 
the documents only when there is an offsetting gain to the system.40 
The work-product doctrine limits access to information by exempting 
from discovery documents prepared by attorneys (or at their direction) in 
anticipation of litigation.41  Much of the current jurisprudence concerning 
work-product privilege stems from the first case in which the privilege was 
recognized, Hickman v. Taylor.42  In Hickman, the plaintiff’s lawyer sought 
to discover “any oral or written statements, records, reports or other 
memoranda . . . concerning any matter relative to the [incident].”43  
Predictably, the defendant’s lawyer objected, arguing that the request was 
“an attempt to obtain indirectly counsel’s private files.”44  The Supreme 
Court, worried that exposing the work product to full discovery would 
reduce the effectiveness of investigation and litigation, held that the 
attorney’s work product should be protected.  Specifically, the Court 
reasoned that “it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of 
privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their 
counsel.”45 
The Hickman Court recognized that allowing liberal discovery of work 
product would discourage zealous investigation.  When preparing for 
litigation, a lawyer does not know what type of information an investigation 
will uncover.46  Certain uncovered information, if turned over to the 
 
38  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note.  “Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts 
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.”  Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). 
39  8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2291 (McNaughton rev. 
1961). 
40  See RONALD ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 787–88 (4th ed. 2006) 
(“The traditional justification for rules of privilege . . . is based on an underlying untested empirical 
assumption: The benefit derived from recognizing a privilege . . . outweighs the cost of barring relevant 
evidence.”). 
41  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
42  329 U.S. 495.  Hickman arose soon after the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were 
introduced, which were intended to produce “the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and fact before 
trial.”  Id. at 501. 
43  Id. at 499. 
44  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
45  Id. at 510–11. 
46  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, XYZ Corp. v. United States, 509 U.S. 905 (1993) (No. 
92-1659), 1993 WL 13076778 (“The rationale for the rule is simply that without it, a litigant will be 
constrained in mounting its defense by the fear that its own efforts will prove even more beneficial to its 
adversary than to itself . . . .”). 
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adversary, could be detrimental to the very case for which the lawyer was 
hired.47  Thus, if lawyers were required to turn over all work product during 
discovery, they would have an incentive to refrain from investigating the 
case.48 
The Hickman opinion also expressed concern about the free-riding 
effect of mandating full disclosure during discovery.  Without protection for 
each attorney’s efforts, an opposing party could gain advantages otherwise 
unavailable.  As the concurring opinion explained, disclosure is not proper 
when it would allow one party to “perform its functions . . . on wits 
borrowed from the adversary.”49  Thus, one purpose of the work-product 
doctrine is often stated as “prevent[ing] exploitation of a party’s efforts in 
preparing for litigation.”50 
The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the strong public 
policy supporting the work-product doctrine.51  However, because the work-
product doctrine requires courts to balance competing interests in privacy 
and transparency, it necessarily remains a flexible standard.  Thus, courts 
have employed two methods for narrowing or expanding the doctrine’s 
protection as policy dictates: first, the substantial need exception, and, 
second, the interpretation of the phrase “in anticipation of litigation.” 
A. Substantial Need Exception 
The work-product doctrine is not absolute.  Case law and Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) allow a court to order the production of work 
product if the party seeking discovery has demonstrated a substantial need 
and if obtaining the material through an alternative means would create 
substantial hardship.52  This qualification promotes efficiency in the 
litigation system.  Thus, if one party’s need for the information 
(transparency) outweighs the other party’s interest in preventing the 
information from being released (privacy), then the court will order 
disclosure.53 
“Substantial need” is not clearly defined.  Need is generally found 
when one side has obtained statements from witnesses who are now 
 
47  See Ronald J. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work 
Product Doctrine, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 385–87 (1990); cf. Ronald J. Allen & Cynthia M. 
Hazelwood, Preserving the Confidentiality of Internal Corporate Investigations, 12 J. CORP. L. 355, 357 
(1987) (noting that corporations face similar challenges without a self-evaluative privilege). 
48  See Allen et al., supra note 47, at 385–87. 
49  Hickman, 329 U.S. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
50  Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Ariz., 881 F.2d 1486, 1494 (9th Cir. 1989). 
51  See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 
225, 236–40 (1975). 
52  2 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT 
DOCTRINE 922 (5th ed. 2007). 
53  See id. at 944. 
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unavailable because of death, faulty memory, or inability to be found or 
subpoenaed.54  The requirement of undue hardship, which comes directly 
from Hickman, is similarly loosely defined.  Referring to the liberal ideas of 
discovery in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court recognized that 
“production might be justified where the witnesses are no longer available 
or can be reached only with difficulty.”55  Courts have typically interpreted 
this to mean that neither a “general fishing expedition”56 nor a showing of 
significant cost alone57 is sufficient to lift the protection. 
Finally, when disclosure is proper, courts distinguish between opinion 
work product and ordinary work product.  While ordinary work product can 
consist of any documents prepared by or at the request of an attorney, 
opinion work product generally consists of an attorney’s mental 
impressions, analyses, legal conclusions, and opinions.58  Both the Rules 
Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court have noted the distinction.59  
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in fact, require that courts ordering 
discovery of documents make efforts to “protect against disclosure of the 
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s 
attorney,”60 sometimes making it “necessary to order disclosure of a 
document but with portions deleted.”61  And while the Court has not said 
that opinion work product is always protected, it has required “a far 
stronger showing of necessity and unavailability.”62  Furthermore, courts 
have given nearly absolute protection to opinion work product that contains 
assessments of arguments, defenses, and expected settlement amounts.63 
B. In Anticipation of Litigation 
The work-product doctrine protects only documents prepared in 
anticipation of litigation, not those prepared in the ordinary course of 
business.64  However, distinguishing between the two types of documents is 
 
54  Id. at 925–31. 
55  Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). 
56  In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated November 8, 1979, 622 F.2d 933, 936 (6th Cir. 1980). 
57  EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 942–43 (indicating that this view may be softening as courts become 
more aware of the cost of litigation). 
58  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee’s note. 
59  Id.; see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400 (1981); Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508. 
60  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B). 
61  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee’s note. 
62  Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 401–02; see also Banks v. Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, 
228 F.R.D. 24, 26 (D.D.C. 2005) (stating that opinion work product is “entitled to special protection and 
require[s] a stronger showing of necessity to justify release . . . although the precise contours of this 
showing have not been resolved.” (quoting Byers v. Burleson, 100 F.R.D. 436, 439 (D.D.C. 1983)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
63  EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 950. 
64  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee’s note (“Materials assembled in the ordinary course 
of business, or pursuant to public requirements unrelated to litigation [are not protected work 
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often extremely difficult.  Thus far, the courts’ varying interpretations of “in 
anticipation of litigation” have generated considerable confusion, and 
Textron clearly demonstrates this confusion. 
The phrase “in anticipation of litigation” has both temporal and 
motivational aspects,65 though only the second causes problems in Textron.  
The Supreme Court has interpreted the temporal condition quite broadly, 
and there seems to be little question that a corporation is allowed to 
anticipate litigation at the time that a questionable tax position is originally 
taken.66  The motivational aspect, on the other hand, has proven much 
murkier.  Seven of the nine circuits that have ruled on the issue—the 
Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits—follow the 
“because of” test, which protects all material that is prepared because of 
anticipated litigation.67  The Fifth Circuit adheres to the “primary purpose” 
test, which only protects documents prepared with the primary purpose of 
litigation.68  In Textron, the First Circuit effectively created a third rule, 
which could be called the “prepared for litigation” rule because it protects 
only documents prepared for use in litigation.69 
Generally speaking, on the one hand, courts employ the “because of” 
test to provide broader protection for work product.70  On the other hand, 
courts that read Hickman narrowly as protecting only very specific 
litigation documents follow the primary purpose standard.71  As a result, 
single-purpose documents—those prepared solely for litigation or solely for 
a business purposes—are easily classified under either test.  Dual-purpose 
documents, however, which may be prepared because of litigation but also 
 
product].”).  But see Thomas Wilson, Note, The Work Product Doctrine: Why Have an Ordinary Course 
of Business Exception?, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 587, 604 (noting that although the “[risk 
assessment] documents themselves were not drafted specifically for use in litigation by the attorney, 
allowing discovery of such documents gives plaintiffs an unjustifiable advantage”). 
65  EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 836. 
66  See Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 397 (holding that the privilege applied when the investigation 
started). 
67  See, e.g., United States v. Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590, 593 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Torf 
(In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 357 F.3d 900, 907 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 
1194, 1202–03 (2d Cir. 1998); In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Martin v. Bally’s 
Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d 1252, 1260 (3d Cir. 1993); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh 
v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992); Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 
397, 401 (8th Cir. 1987); Binks Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Presto Indus., 709 F.2d 1109, 1118–19 (7th Cir. 
1983). 
68  United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 543 (5th Cir. 1982). 
69  United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc); see also United States v. 
Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 138 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Judge Torruella’s dissenting opinion in Textron 
makes a strong argument that while the court said it was applying the ‘because of’ test, it actually asked 
whether the documents were ‘prepared for use in possible litigation,’ a much more exacting standard.” 
(citing Textron, 577 F.3d at 32)). 
70  See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1197–98. 
71  See, e.g., El Paso, 682 F.2d at 542 (“The accent in Hickman was on a lawyer’s need for a sphere 
of privacy in preparing a lawsuit.”). 
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serve a business purpose, may be treated differently depending on which 
test the court applies. 
1. The “Because Of” Test.—The Second Circuit opinion in United 
States v. Adlman, which adopted the “because of” test, is frequently cited as 
leading authority on the test.72  The court considered whether the work-
product doctrine applies to litigation analysis prepared “to inform a 
business decision which turns on the party’s assessment of the likely 
outcome of litigation.”73  The IRS had requested documents concerning a 
restructuring transaction, including a fifty-eight-page memorandum that 
“detailed [the] legal analysis of likely IRS challenges to the reorganization 
and the resulting tax refund claim.”74 
The court recognized that the work-product doctrine incentivizes 
attorneys to evaluate their cases and record their impressions in writing.  
Such writings include documents assessing the strengths and weaknesses of 
one’s case, and these documents are frequently created for business-related 
reasons.75  If such documents were unprotected simply because they were 
prepared for a business purpose, one party would be able to take advantage 
of the other’s assessment of victory, an “unwarranted” result.76  Thus, the 
court found that a standard that protected all documents prepared “because 
of” anticipation of litigation, whether or not for a business purpose, 
“appropriately focuses on both what should be eligible for the Rule’s 
protection and what should not” and adopted that language as the proper 
standard by which to assess whether a document had been prepared in 
anticipation of litigation.77 
The Sixth Circuit’s recent adoption of the “because of” test in United 
States v. Roxworthy78 demonstrates a current variation of the standard.  The 
court acknowledged that the contents of the documents—an analysis of the 
likely outcome of litigation that might result from a corporate restructuring, 
containing “dense legal analysis of current tax law” and an indication of 
whether “it is more likely than not” that particular federal tax consequences 
would result—could be used by the IRS to obtain an unfair advantage and 
 
72  EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 857; see also Textron, 577 F.3d at 34 (Torruella, J., dissenting) 
(referring to Adlman as “a leading case interpreting the work-product doctrine”). 
73  Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1197. 
74  Id. at 1195 (“[The memorandum] contained discussion of statutory provisions, IRS regulations, 
legislative history, and prior judicial and IRS rulings relevant to the claim.  It proposed possible legal 
theories or strategies for [the company] to adopt in response, recommended preferred methods of 
structuring the transaction, and made predictions about the likely outcome of litigation.”). 
75  Id. at 1201–02. 
76  Id. at 1202. 
77  Id. at 1203. 
78  457 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2006). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 930 
thus “weigh[ed] in favor of recognizing the documents as privileged.”79  
Nonetheless, the Roxworthy court used a subjective–objective lens, 
considering both whether the defendants anticipated litigation and, if so, 
whether that anticipation was objectively reasonable.80  First, looking at the 
“circumstances surrounding the documents’ creation” rather than the 
documents themselves, the court reasoned that the documents resulted from 
subjective anticipation of litigation.81  Second, after considering the 
company’s expectation of a yearly audit, the size of the transaction 
involved, and the auditor’s assessment that the transaction concerned an 
unsettled area of law that had been recently targeted by the IRS, the court 
found it objectively reasonable for the defendant to anticipate litigation.82  
Thus, the Sixth Circuit applied the “because of” test to protect a dual-
purpose document. 
2. The Primary Purpose Test.—The most frequently cited case for 
the primary purpose test is the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. El 
Paso Co.83  The El Paso court held that tax accrual workpapers are not 
prepared for the “primary purpose” of litigation.84  Applying the primary 
purpose test to tax accrual workpapers, the court emphasized the inherent 
complexity of tax laws and the “business reality” that filing of taxes is not 
the last word.85  First, the court observed that the papers were prepared to 
please accountants, who are responsible for adhering to securities laws.86  
Second, the court recognized that the legal analysis was simply a means to 
reach business-imperative ends.87  These two motivations led the court to 
the conclusion that “the primary motivating force” was financial reporting.88 
Unfortunately, the El Paso court did not explain why it was adopting 
the primary purpose test.89  It simply applied the standard laid out in United 
States v. Davis.90  The problem, however, is that Davis did not analyze the 
primary purpose test either but merely concluded that “litigation need not 
necessarily be imminent, as some courts have suggested, as long as the 
 
79  Id. at 594–95 (“[T]he IRS would appear to obtain an unfair advantage by gaining access to [the 
auditor’s] detailed legal analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of [the defendant’s] position.  This 
factor weighs in favor of recognizing the documents as privileged.”). 
80  Id. 
81  Id. at 595–97. 
82  Id. at 600. 
83  682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982). 
84  Id. at 543–44. 
85  Id. at 534. 
86  Id. at 543. 
87  Id. 
88  Id.  Importantly, the court did not decide whether the documents were also motivated by 
anticipated litigation; thus, the court’s reasoning does not foreclose the possibility that tax accrual 
workpapers can be eligible for protection in a circuit that follows the “because of” test.  
89  Id. at 542–43. 
90  636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document was to aid 
in possible future litigation.”91  Thus, neither El Paso nor Davis provides 
any substantive rationale for choosing the primary purpose test over the 
“because of” test. 
 
III. WHAT HAPPENED IN TEXTRON 
A. Background 
Textron Inc. is an aerospace and defense conglomerate with 
approximately 190 subsidiaries.92  As it does with other large corporations, 
the IRS periodically audits Textron’s federal tax returns.93  Textron can 
dispute any tax increase through an informal conference with the IRS 
attorneys, a formal appeal through the IRS, or a lawsuit in federal court if 
the other processes fail to resolve the dispute.94  Textron had disputed 
proposed adjustments in seven of the eight audit cycles since 1980,95 and 
these disputes resulted in litigation three times.96 
Textron involved the 2003 IRS audit of Textron’s 1998–2001 tax 
returns.  Textron Financial Corporation, a Textron subsidiary, disclosed 
nine sale-in, lease-out (SILO) transactions entered into during 2001.97  
These SILO transactions involved Textron’s purchasing equipment from a 
foreign entity and leasing it back to the seller on the same day.98  Although 
SILO transactions can be legal and serve legitimate ends, the IRS has 
flagged these transactions as potential tax shelters subject to abuse and 
considers them “listed transactions.”99  Consistent with the IRS’s then-four-
month-old policy to request all tax accrual workpapers when presented with 
two or more listed transactions, the agency summoned Textron’s 
workpapers.100  Textron was the first case brought after the change in IRS 
policy.101 
Textron acknowledged that the immediate purpose of the workpapers 
was to aid in the creation of the reserve figures that would be represented on 
 
91  Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
92  United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 141 (D.R.I. 2007). 
93  Id.  During these audits, the IRS may issue a Notice of Proposed Adjustments to the taxpayer 
indicating that the IRS disagrees with a position the corporation took on its tax returns and intends to 
levy additional taxes.  Id. 
94  Id. 
95  Id. 
96  Id. at 141–42. 
97  Id. at 142. 
98  See United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 23–24 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
99  Id. 
100  See id. at 24 (citing I.R.S. Announcement 2002-63, 2002-27 I.R.B. 72).  
101  Greenhouse & Kelleher, supra note 26, at 255. 
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the audited financial statement,102 bringing the statement into compliance 
with the now-applicable FIN 48 rule.  Nonetheless, Textron also asserted 
that the workpapers were prepared because of anticipated litigation and 
pointed to the hazards of litigation percentages as evidence of this 
purpose.103  The IRS maintained that the papers were created in the ordinary 
course of business to meet regulatory requirements.104  The Rhode Island 
District Court, following Maine v. United States Department of the 
Interior,105 applied the “because of” test and concluded that the tax accrual 
workpapers are protected documents.106  A First Circuit panel agreed, 
holding that the two purposes of the documents are “inextricably related” 
and that the presence of a business purpose does not contradict the fact that 
the workpapers were prepared because of litigation.107 
After granting the Government’s petition for a rehearing, the en banc 
First Circuit vacated the panel decision and entered judgment for the 
Government.  The court held that “the Textron work papers were 
independently required by statutory and audit requirements,” not in 
anticipation of litigation, “and that the work product privilege does not 
apply.”108  In reaching this conclusion, the court explicitly stated that it was 
reaffirming the Maine standard, but it read its holding in Maine more 
narrowly than had previous courts.109  Importantly, the court also explained 
that the scope of the work-product protection “turns on a balancing of 
policy concerns.”110  Part IV below discusses why the court, although 
correct to address the balance of public policy concerns, failed by not 
articulating the correct role these concerns should play in the analysis of the 
scope of “in anticipation of litigation.”  First, however, the remainder of this 
Part examines the court’s analysis. 
 
102  Textron, 577 F.3d at 25. 
103  See id. at 24–25. 
104  Textron, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 150. 
105  298 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2002).  In Maine, the State of Maine sought information filed in a previous 
lawsuit pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  Id.  The Department of the Interior 
withheld over three hundred documents, claiming that they were protected by the work-product doctrine.  
After quoting the Second Circuit opinion in Adlman at length and agreeing that the primary purpose 
standard is at odds with the policies of Rule 26, the court adopted “the formulation of the work-product 
rule adopted in Adlman and by five other courts of appeals.”  Id. at 68. 
106  The court relied on the fact that the documents would not have been prepared “but for” litigation 
and dismissed the fact that they also served a business purpose as irrelevant under the “because of” 
standard.  Textron, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 150.  It also agreed that the anticipation was well-founded because 
of the unclear tax laws and the fact that Textron was regularly audited and had disputed positions in the 
past.  Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 95–96. 
107  Textron, 577 F.3d at 26. 
108  Id. 
109  Id. 
110  Id. 
105:919  (2011) Tax Accrual Workpapers and Textron 
 933 
B. The En Banc Opinion 
The Textron court identified four sources that should inform its 
decision: Rule 26, Supreme Court doctrine, direct precedent, and the court’s 
own policy judgment.111  It also noted that each source favored the IRS.  
First, the court explained that the “focus of work product protection has 
been on materials prepared for use in litigation.”112  Relying on English 
precedent as “doubtless the source of the language in Rule 26” and 
seemingly ignoring the more recent history, the court determined that only 
documents that were to be used in actual or anticipated litigation should be 
protected.113  “Every lawyer who tries cases,” claimed the court in the now 
infamous line, “knows the touch and feel of materials prepared for a current 
or possible (i.e., ‘in anticipation of’) law suit.”114 
Turning to direct precedent, the majority said that it was reaffirming 
Maine115 but, as the dissent properly pointed out, applied Maine in a novel 
way.116  Although Maine is generally cited for showing that the First Circuit 
adopted the “because of” test, the Textron court simply commented that 
“[i]n Maine, we said that work product protection does not extend to 
‘documents that are prepared in the ordinary course of business or that 
would have been created in essentially similar form irrespective of the 
litigation.’”117  Effectively, the court used Maine only to introduce the rule 
that documents prepared in the ordinary course of business are not protected 
by the work-product doctrine—a virtual truism—regardless of the test 
employed in the circuit. 
Looking at other circuit precedent on point, the court also found 
persuasive the Fifth Circuit’s determination in El Paso that the tax accrual 
workpapers’ “‘sole function’ was to back up financial statements.”118  The 
Textron court simply adopted this reasoning to hold that tax accrual 
workpapers must not have been prepared in anticipation of litigation.  
However, the Textron court erred in its adoption of the Fifth Circuit’s 
reasoning because the Fifth Circuit applied the primary purpose test, not the 
“because of” test.  Under its primary purpose test, documents prepared only 
for financial statements are treated in the same way as documents prepared 
primarily for financial statements that also serve a litigation purpose: they 
 
111  Id. at 29. 
112  Id. 
113  Id. 
114  Id. at 30. 
115  Id. at 26. 
116  The Textron dissent opened with a telling statement by Judge Torruella: “To assist the IRS in its 
quest to compel taxpayers to reveal their own assessments of their tax returns, the majority abandons our 
‘because of’ test . . . .”  Id. at 32 (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
117  Id. at 30 (majority opinion) (quoting Maine v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 70 (1st 
Cir. 2002)). 
118  Id. (citing United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 543–44 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
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are not protected.  Although the existence of a litigation purpose is 
irrelevant under the primary purpose test, if the primary purpose is for 
financial statements, the presence of a litigation purpose can be critical 
under the “because of” test applied in the First Circuit.119 
Finally, the court discussed policy reasons for requiring the disclosure 
of the tax accrual workpapers.  The discussion, however, focused on 
implications to the IRS and failed to analyze the implications protection 
would have on taxpayers.  Simply noting that work-product protection of 
tax accrual workpapers would decrease the ease with which the IRS could 
collect taxes, the court reasoned that policy considerations weighed in favor 
of disclosure.  While the dissent found this reliance on policy generally 
objectionable, this Note argues below that the court should have considered 
a broader set of policy concerns and more carefully weighed the impact of 
disclosure. 
 
IV. HOW TO INTERPRET AND APPLY THE TEXTRON RULING 
This Part begins by showing that the Textron en banc court incorrectly 
applied existing First Circuit case law.  It then suggests that the court 
should have explicitly acknowledged that it was establishing a new test.  
Next, recognizing the en banc court’s authority to change the law of the 
circuit, this Part also suggests that the panel should have explicitly modified 
the judicially imposed tests to incorporate the policy concerns it found to be 
important.  Finally, this Part proposes that courts adopt a new standard to 
clarify work-product doctrine jurisprudence.  Specifically, the concerns 
raised in Textron demonstrate why the courts should adopt a modified 
“because of” standard for interpreting whether or not a document was 
prepared in anticipation of litigation. 
A. The Court Incorrectly Applied First Circuit Law 
The Textron court incorrectly interpreted Maine and incorrectly 
applied the “because of” test.  To demonstrate how the court misread 
Maine, which if applied correctly would have protected the papers at issue 
in Textron, this section considers the steps the court should have followed 
when applying Maine.  First, the majority should have recognized that the 
tax accrual workpapers consisted of counsel’s opinions and legal 
assessments.  Second, the majority should have acknowledged that the tax 
 
119  The D.C. Circuit recognized this conflict when it refused to rely on El Paso to infer that audit 
papers were not created for litigation.  United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 138 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(“El Paso was decided under the ‘primary motivating purpose’ test, which is more demanding than the 
‘because of’ test we employ.  Under the more lenient ‘because of’ test, material generated in anticipation 
of litigation may also be used for ordinary business purposes without losing its protected status.”). 
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accrual workpapers were prepared not only for business purposes but also 
for anticipated litigation. 
Textron’s tax accrual workpapers consisted almost completely of 
Textron’s counsel’s assessments of the likelihood of prevailing in a dispute 
if particular tax positions were challenged.120  That is, the papers focused on 
opinion, not fact.  Litigation assessments are considered the archetype of 
attorney-opinion work product and, as such, receive nearly absolute 
protection.121  Notably, the Textron court did not acknowledge the 
significance of other circuit cases related to individual case reserves—i.e., 
accounting reserves related to a single issue rather than to a group of issues.  
The Southern District of New York, for example, determined that 
individual case reserves should be distinguished from aggregate reserves 
and recognized as protected under both the “because of” and primary 
purpose tests.122  Similarly, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that disclosing 
individual case reserves “reveal[s] the mental impression, thoughts, and 
conclusions of an attorney in evaluating a legal claim.”123  The Eighth 
Circuit further noted that individual reserves are by their very nature 
prepared in anticipation of litigation and “consequently . . . are protected 
from discovery as opinion work product.”124  Rather than recognizing this 
line of cases, the Textron court contrasted tax accrual workpapers with 
“documents unquestionably prepared for potential use in litigation” and 
concluded that “[t]here is no evidence in this case that the work papers were 
prepared for such a use or would in fact serve any useful purpose for 
Textron in conducting litigation if it arose.”125 
The court additionally failed to recognize the irony in the IRS’s claim 
that the workpapers were relevant because they might identify transactions 
that the IRS had not identified or fully discovered.126  This justification is in 
stark contrast to the rationale for the work-product doctrine—preventing 
one party from obtaining the other side’s legal analysis of potential 
litigation.127  Thus, the majority should have concluded that the papers were 
protectable work product based on the content of the workpapers 
themselves. 
 
120  United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 147 (D.R.I. 2007). 
121  See EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 969. 
122  In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 90 Civ. 1260 (SS), 1993 WL 561125, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 
1993). 
123  Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 401 (8th Cir. 1987). 
124  Id.; see also In re Pfizer Inc., 1993 WL 561125, at *4 (applying the primary purpose test, stating 
that individual case reserves are “typical examples of opinion work product,” and contrasting individual 
case reserves that do not provide meaningful information for the business purpose of preparing a 
financial return with aggregate information that serves a meaningful business purpose). 
125  United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
126  Greenhouse & Kelleher, supra note 26, at 256. 
127  See Letter from Nelson & Fisher, supra note 32. 
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Second, the Textron court incorrectly determined that the documents’ 
only purpose was to prepare financial statements and that they thus were 
not prepared in anticipation of litigation.128  In addition to the faulty reliance 
on El Paso,129 the court’s decision that the documents were created only for 
financial statements was largely based on testimony from a Textron 
executive and IRS officials, and the court emphasized that even if litigation 
were remote, Textron would have to prepare the papers to support its 
financial statements.130  This argument, however, ignores much of the 
regulatory and practical circumstances surrounding tax accrual workpapers.  
To start, but for the prospect of a redetermination by the IRS and possible 
ensuing litigation, there would be no reason for the corporation to establish 
the reserves found in the documents.131  Additionally, while the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act imposes requirements on the officers of the firm to oversee the 
preparation of financial statements in accordance with Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP), including the provision for income tax and 
related reserves,132 it is incorrect to argue that a requirement to provide 
certified financial statements is the same as a requirement to prepare tax 
accrual workpapers in the elaborate form prepared by Textron.133  As 
explained by one commentator, “The dual purpose nature of the 
workpapers—to evaluate litigation risks and to also satisfy the auditors that 
the reserves comply with GAAP—does not preclude a finding of work 
product privilege in a circuit that follows the ‘because of’ standard.”134 
Skeptics may counter that the workpapers were not prepared in 
anticipation of litigation because they were prepared prior to an adversarial 
stage and because they only assess the likelihood of success on the merits as 
a basis for the position taken on the filed return.135  This argument, however, 
confuses the temporal and motivational aspects of the phrase “in 
anticipation of litigation.”  Courts have interpreted the temporal 
requirement broadly and generally accept that regular audits combined with 
unclear tax positions and listed transactions suffice to establish 
 
128  Textron, 577 F.3d at 30.  Based on this incorrect conclusion, the court correctly determined that 
the documents were not prepared in anticipation of litigation because documents prepared in the 
ordinary course of business (e.g., to prepare financial statements) are not protected. 
129  See supra text accompanying notes 119–21. 
130  Textron, 577 F.3d at 28.  This assumption, whether accurate or not in Textron’s case, will likely 
be accurate in future cases because of the requirements imposed by FIN 48.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 35–37. 
131  Henkel, supra note 5, at 239. 
132  15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006).  Note that this requirement was not in effect at the time Textron 
created the workpapers, but the argument would apply to workpapers created after 2002.  
133  Henkel, supra note 5, at 239. 
134  See id. at 240. 
135  Linda M. Beale, Textron, Inc.: Tax Accrual Workpapers, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Work 
Product Protection, A TAXING MATTER (Aug. 30, 2007), http://ataxingmatter.blogs.com/tax/2007/08/
textron-inc-tax.html. 
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“anticipation of litigation.”136  On the motivational aspect, this 
counterargument merely establishes that the papers are dual-purpose 
documents.  The tax accrual workpapers were litigation analyses “prepared 
to inform a business decision,” specifically the appropriate tax position to 
be taken on an IRS filing.  The decision turned “on the party’s assessment 
of the likely outcome of litigation.”137  As established above, the mere fact 
that workpapers also aid in a business decision does not preclude their 
protection under the “because of” test. 
In summary, under the traditional “because of” standard previously 
adopted by the First Circuit, Textron’s workpapers constitute protectable 
work product, were prepared in anticipation of litigation, and thus should be 
protected.138  Although the court determined that the tax accrual workpapers 
were not “for use” in the litigation anticipated,139 this unprecedented 
construction is inconsistent with the First Circuit’s “because of” test and 
with the Hickman doctrine more broadly.  As the dissent noted, the “for 
use” language used by the majority unnecessarily narrows the scope of the 
doctrine140 because many documents prepared because of litigation and 
unquestionably protected by the doctrine are not used in conducting the 
actual trial—the primary example being litigation assessments.141  Although 
the en banc court may have wished to mandate the disclosure of the 
documents for legitimate policy reasons,142 it masked its analysis in a faulty 
application of precedent. 
 
136  See supra text accompanying notes 65–66. 
137  See United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1197 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Robert T. Duffy, 
How the Attorney Work Product Doctrine Can Protect Tax Accrual Workpapers from IRS Summons, 
TAX NEWS FOR BUS. LAW. (Am. Bar Ass’n Bus. Law Comm’n on Taxation), Apr. 3, 2009, at 1, 
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL690000pub/newsletter/200904/duffy.pdf (“The First 
Circuit held that because ‘the function of the documents’—of the tax accrual workpapers that Textron 
prepared—‘was to analyze litigation for the purpose of creating and auditing a reserve fund,’ it follows 
that Textron prepared those workpapers ‘because of’ the prospect of litigation.”). 
138  After applying this test, the court must still determine whether any of the defined exceptions, 
such as “substantial need” or “undue hardship,” mandate disclosure.  This answer appears to be 
substantially clearer than the anticipation question.  As opinion work product, if documents are prepared 
in anticipation of litigation, there is very little room for an exception.  Although some courts have found 
that there is never an exception, the Supreme Court has indicated that it would take an extreme showing 
of necessity.  See supra text accompanying notes 58–63.  In Textron, confirming this analysis, the 
district court found that the IRS had failed to show a need that overcame the need for work-product 
protection.  United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 141 (D.R.I. 2007).  Thus, under the First 
Circuit’s “because of” test, the tax accrual workpapers should have been protected from disclosure to the 
IRS.  Id. 
139  United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
140  See id. at 32 (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
141  See supra text accompanying notes 121–24. 
142  See infra Part IV.B. 
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B. The Court Should Not Have Felt Constrained by the Language of the 
“Because of” Test 
The en banc court should have explicitly acknowledged that it was 
abandoning the “because of” test in order to directly address the competing 
policy concerns and the potential effects of any test on various stakeholders.  
Courts, especially an en banc court admitting the lack of Supreme Court 
precedent on point, should consider the reasons behind a rule before blindly 
applying court-made tests or, in this case, artificially applying court-made 
tests.  Instead, by attempting to work within the language set by Adlman 
and Maine, the Textron court created an incoherent opinion. 
As noted above, the court claimed to make its decision because “the 
only purpose of Textron’s papers was to prepare financial statements.”143  
Yet this simple analysis raises three complex issues.  First, as a practical 
matter, it is questionable whether tax accrual workpapers are prepared only 
for the purpose of preparing financial statements.  As explained above, the 
court oversimplified this question and brushed over the fact that the tax 
accrual workpapers were prepared for multiple reasons.144  Second, the 
opinion nominally reaffirmed a “because of” standard, but it actually 
created a new “for use” standard without explicitly stating its reasons for 
the change and without addressing the fact that neither standard would 
protect documents prepared for the sole purpose of preparing financial 
statements.145  And third, the court did not need to address policy 
considerations to determine the purpose of the documents but nevertheless 
spent significant time discussing the IRS’s concerns.  The court’s confusion 
on these issues is clear in the majority’s penultimate paragraph, in which 
the judges tried to balance multiple considerations: 
To sum up, the work product privilege is aimed at protecting work done for 
litigation, not in preparing financial statements.  Textron’s work papers were 
prepared to support financial filings and gain auditor approval; the compulsion 
of the securities laws and auditing requirements assure that they will be 
carefully prepared, in their present form, even though not protected; and IRS 
access serves the legitimate, and important, function of detecting and 
disallowing abusive tax shelters.146 
Though each sentence may be true individually, linking them together does 
not produce a coherent argument.  The court tried to force an analysis of 
policy interests while “following” the current standard.  And the court 
failed to explicitly acknowledge that policy arguments are appropriate when 
determining the breadth of the work-product doctrine. 
 
143  Textron, 577 F.3d at 30. 
144  See supra text accompanying notes 128–30. 
145  Textron, 577 F.3d at 30. 
146  Id. at 31–32. 
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A clear acknowledgement of the competing interests would have been 
in line with the Supreme Court’s analysis in United States v. Arthur Young 
& Co.,147 where the Supreme Court articulated its decision not to create 
accountant work-product immunity by assessing the effects that such 
protection would have on the public interest.148  Specifically, the Court 
analyzed the need for “full disclosures by corporate clients to their 
independent accountants” and “the need of the Government for full 
disclosure of all information relevant to tax liability.”149  Similarly, changes 
in the scope of the attorney work-product doctrine should be analyzed based 
on the effects they would have on litigation behavior.  The Textron court 
should have taken a two-step approach to analyzing the effects of protecting 
the tax accrual workpapers.  The first step should have been to identify the 
various stakeholders and to determine how disclosure would alter their 
incentives.  The second step should have been to determine if the resulting 
change would be a net positive or negative to the litigation process. 
As a number of amicus briefs attested, protecting tax accrual 
workpapers has benefits: the vast majority of in-house counsel find that 
work-product protection facilitates their work and believe that disclosure 
would cause employees to hesitate to assist counsel in preparing for 
litigation.150  The Association of Corporate Counsel argues that the 
evolution of the work-product doctrine has allowed corporations to rely on 
attorneys for “preventive legal advice” and urges that “attorneys must not 
be chilled from thoroughly analyzing the legal problems faced by their 
clients.”151  The group warns that an “inevitable result [of a narrow ‘for use’ 
standard] will be a reduction in effective self-policing and a rise in 
mismanaged transactions, with litigation inevitably following.”152 
In tax situations specifically, protection likely encourages a detailed 
analysis of tax positions and review of information in order to accurately 
predict the outcome of possible litigation arising from questionable tax 
positions.  Forced disclosure of all documents prepared in assessing tax 
liability could lead to decreased diligence in the preparation and particularly 
the investigation stages.  In fact, the Textron court acknowledged the danger 
of discouraging sound preparation for a lawsuit.153  In addition, disclosure 
may decrease the ability of the IRS to collect taxes without lengthy 
 
147  465 U.S. 805 (1984). 
148  Id. at 815–21. 
149  Id. at 821.  In the end, the Court decided that it should not “reduce irrevocably the § 7602 
summons power” and left the possibility of creating a new accountant privilege to the legislature.  Id. 
150  H.R. REP. NO. 110-445, at 2 (2007) (“96% of in-house counsel respondents reported that the 
privilege and work product doctrines serve an important purpose in facilitating their work as company 
counsel.”). 
151  Brief for Amicus Curiae Association of Corporate Counsel in Support of Petitioner at 2, Textron 
Inc. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3320 (2010) (No. 09-750), 2010 WL 342152. 
152  Id. at 9. 
153  United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
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administrative hearings because, some argue, allowing the workpapers to be 
discovered would increase the amount of litigation between the IRS and 
taxpayers and extend the examination period.154 
But others argue that the predicted disadvantages of disclosure are 
exaggerated and that disclosure has additional benefits that critics do not 
acknowledge.  For example, outside legal obligations to prepare tax 
documents could mitigate the incentive to avoid creating the documents 
because similar information would be available to the IRS in largely the 
same manner.  The Textron court accepted this argument,155 and the 
adoption of FIN 48 lends it further credibility.  Although FIN 48 likely does 
not require documents as detailed as the tax accrual workpapers now in 
question, the regulation may be enough to ensure the quality of the work 
and diligence in the investigation.  In light of these alternative incentives, 
the effects of disclosing the workpapers may be beneficial. 
Another key argument favoring disclosure of tax-related documents is 
the widely accepted belief that tax cases are different.156  Supreme Court 
precedent has clarified that the IRS subpoena power is broader than that 
enjoyed by the typical litigant.157  As the en banc panel in Textron noted, it 
is also clear that a “broad public interest” has been established in favor of 
maintaining a sound tax system158: “[T]ax collection is not a game.  
Underpaying taxes threatens the essential public interest in revenue 
collection.”159  For transactions that the IRS views as suspicious, mandating 
more aggressive disclosure may serve the public interest by facilitating 
detection of abusive and illegal practices.  Additionally, as the Ninth Circuit 
 
154  Letter from Nelson & Fisher, supra note 32; see also Bassin, supra note 24, at 573 
(“[C]orporations note that the potential for disclosure of tax accrual workpapers produces perverse 
incentives; unethical taxpayers who do not take their obligations under FIN 48 seriously and who do not 
prepare thorough workpapers will be able to maintain more secrets from the IRS (and possibly pay less 
tax) than honest taxpayers who prepare more thorough workpapers.”). 
155  Textron, 577 F.3d at 31 (1st Cir. 2009). 
156  But see Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in 
Support of Petitioner at 9–10, Textron, 130 S. Ct. 3320 (No. 09-750), 2010 WL 320378 (explaining that 
the IRS already has additional unique tools and should not receive an extra exception). 
157  The IRS has broad authority to issue a summons under I.R.C. § 7602 (2006).  Sections 7402(b) 
and 7604(a) of the Internal Revenue Code grant jurisdiction to district courts to enforce a summons, and 
section 7604(b) governs the general enforcement of summonses by the IRS.  “These grants of power are 
to be liberally construed in recognition of the vital public purposes which they serve . . . .”  De Masters 
v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79, 87 (9th Cir. 1963). 
158  United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982); see also United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 
(1964) (maintaining a relatively low bar for the IRS to meet when seeking judicial enforcement of its 
orders); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642–43 (1950) (analogizing the broad IRS 
power of inquisition and investigation to that of a grand jury’s power to “investigate merely on suspicion 
that the law is being violated”); United States v. Ins. Consultants of Knox, Inc., 187 F.3d 755, 759 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (reaffirming the “minimal burden” of the IRS when issuing summonses); United States v. 
Miller, 150 F.3d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 1998) (describing the broad power of the IRS to issue summonses 
when investigating violations of the tax code). 
159  Textron, 577 F.3d at 31. 
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proclaimed, judicial intervention in the investigation stage of tax matters 
should be limited to prevent undue delay in tax collection.160  These factors, 
then, indicate that both the litigation system and general public policy 
interest are furthered through withholding work-product protection from tax 
accrual workpapers. 
Once a court has assessed how disclosure would alter stakeholders’ 
incentives, it should analyze the resulting changes to identify the position 
that best serves the public interest and that leads to positive changes and 
increased efficiency in litigation.161  Unfortunately, the precise balance may 
not be as obvious, and the cursory analysis provided by the court in Textron 
does not strike a convincing balance.  The court, though emphasizing the 
importance of tax collection, merely noted that encouraging corporations to 
continue current practices is less important than the efficiency gains created 
by the IRS reviewing the tax accrual workpapers.162  If that is true, then 
efficiency gains would be created by disclosing the workpapers, and the 
work-product doctrine should not apply.  This is in line with the conclusion 
drawn in the preceding paragraphs.  Yet the court acted as if constrained by 
the old work-product standard and did not make clear how it weighed the 
costs and benefits of protection in this case, nor did the court provide 
explicit factors to guide future courts attempting to apply the new test to 
different documents.  Because the correct balance and the practical effects 
of protecting the papers is hard to predict ex ante, the court erred by not 
engaging in an in-depth review to ensure that it reached the best answer.163 
C. Proposed Rule: The Modified “Because of” Test 
As Edna Epstein noted, “Looking at the cases, it is not evident that 
either the primary purpose language or the because of . . . language are 
material aids to the analytic process.”164  Courts seeking a bright-line rule 
cannot escape the fact that some documents are created for two reasons, and 
 
160  De Masters, 313 F.2d at 87 (citing Enochs v. Williams Packing Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962)). 
161  This goes beyond looking at what a court believes to be fair.  In United States v. Arthur Young & 
Co., the Supreme Court rejected the “position that fundamental fairness precludes IRS access to 
accountants’ tax accrual workpapers.”  465 U.S. 805, 820 (1984).  Nonetheless, many have weighed in 
on the fairness of disclosure.  See, e.g., United States v. Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590, 595 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(noting it would be “unfair” for the IRS to gain access to the firm’s detailed legal analysis of the 
taxpayer’s position); Letter from Nelson & Fisher, supra note 32 (admonishing the new policy, calling it 
“unfair,” claiming it presented a significant potential for abuse because of the IRS’s authority to declare 
any arrangement to be a listed transaction, and suggesting it “inappropriately alter[s] the balance 
between the IRS and the taxpayer”). 
162  Textron, 577 F.3d at 31–32. 
163  See In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977) (“[C]ourts should proceed cautiously when 
requested to adopt a rule that would have an inhibitive effect on an attorney’s freedom to express and 
record his mental impressions and opinions without fear of having these impressions and opinions used 
against the client.”). 
164  EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 855. 
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“the two purposes cannot be discretely separated from the factual nexus as a 
whole.”165  Though many approaches may get the courts to the same 
conclusions, a modified “because of” test would be the most coherent and 
the most easily applied.  The proposed test would require courts to follow 
the “because of” test when ruling on a single-purpose document.  When 
courts are faced with a dual-purpose document, the test would instruct them 
to look not only at why the document was created—i.e., whether it was 
created because of possible litigation—but also at what the parties would do 
differently next time if the documents were discoverable. 
The shortfalls of the primary purpose test are widely recognized.166  
The Adlman court argued that the primary purpose test “is at odds with the 
text and the policies of the Rule.”167  Focusing on the doctrine’s underlying 
principle of promoting efficient, effective litigation, the Adlman court was 
clearly correct: there is no logical reason why this principle is less relevant 
simply because a document is prepared for multiple uses.  For similar 
reasons, the new “for use” test seemingly advocated by the Textron court 
makes little sense.168  In fact, the dissent labeled the majority’s opinion a 
“bad rule” because the dissenting judges believed it offered no guidance for 
future courts dealing with the scope of the work-product privilege, confused 
the court’s ruling in Maine, and would lead to inefficiencies and “sharp 
practices” if dual-purpose documents were no longer protected.169 
But the “because of” test should not be stretched too far.  The 
“ordinary course of business” language appears, at first, to offer a sound 
principle that limits the doctrine.  The problem is that courts are then left to 
define “ordinary.”  This interpretation especially poses a problem when 
courts are faced with dual-purpose documents.  Any test adopted by the 
courts, then, must address when dual-purpose documents should be 
privileged and when they should be discoverable by the opposing party. 
Unfortunately, a bright line cannot be drawn to deal with all 
documents.  For each type of document, a different policy argument can be 
made for disclosure or protection of the document.170  Courts should start by 
applying the “because of” test but then should consciously analyze, on a 
case-by-case basis, how the disclosure or protection of the documents at 
issue would alter the balance of litigation incentives.  It is in this context 
that it becomes relevant to decide if the documents would have been 
 
165  In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 357 F.3d 900, 910 (9th Cir. 2004). 
166  See supra text accompanying notes 72–77. 
167  United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1998). 
168  See Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in Support 
of Petitioner, supra note 156, at 11. 
169  United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 36 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Torruella, J., 
dissenting). 
170  For example, policy arguments for protecting or disclosing tax accrual workpapers may differ 
from arguments regarding internal investigations.  See, e.g., Allen & Hazelwood, supra note 47, at 357. 
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prepared in the same form regardless of any possible litigation.  If so, the 
adverse incentives are reduced, and there is less reason to protect the 
documents.171  If there are strong reasons to force disclosure of documents 
(or alternatively, no reason to protect documents) that were prepared 
“because of” anticipated litigation, the court should find that the documents 
are not prepared in anticipation of litigation for purposes of the work-
product doctrine. 
The modified “because of” test also responds to critics who argue that 
the “because of” test is too easy to satisfy.172  Work-product protection, they 
argue, should only exist to create a “zone of privacy” when preparing a case 
for trial.173  This construction is generally too narrow a reading of both 
precedent and underlying policy, but these criticisms make more sense in 
the tax context because accounting regulations require a legal assessment of 
the merits of a tax dispute when preparing financial statements.174  FIN 48’s 
“more likely than not” standard clarifies this requirement further.  However, 
this concern and its application in this specific instance should not be 
allowed to dismantle the “because of” test, as criticizing the broad scope of 
the “because of” test ignores the wider implications of employing the 
alternative primary purpose standard (or changing it to a more restrictive 
“for use” standard).175 
The flexibility provided by the modified “because of” test would have 
greatly aided the Textron court, allowing it to openly weigh the IRS’s need 
for the documents against the potential incentives that corporate lawyers 
would face if the documents were not protected.  If the court found that any 
adverse incentives were outweighed by the efficiency gains in litigating tax 
disputes, it could have mandated the disclosure of the documents.  A rule 
should not cause a court to do the type of linguistic gymnastics found in the 
Textron opinion.  This Note therefore offers a modified “because of” test as 
a more coherent interpretation of the “anticipation of litigation” 
requirement, one that is primarily based on the “because of” test but that 
can be tailored to ensure consistency with the doctrine’s underlying 
purpose. 
 
171  See EPSTEIN, supra note 52, at 855. 
172  Beale, supra note 135; see also Elizabeth Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, 77 VA. L. REV. 
1515, 1578 (1991) (arguing that the current exemptions from discovery are too broad). 
173  Beale, supra note 135. 
174  Id. (“Such consideration is required for two reasons—the ‘realistic possibility of success on the 
merits’ and ‘more likely than not’ standards set forth in the Code for evaluating positions to determine 
whether they are strong enough to be advised or reported on a return and the fact that there are judicial 
doctrines (substance-over-form, step transaction, economic substance, business purpose) that must be 
evaluated to determine whether a position may be reported on a return.”). 
175  See United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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D. Textron Takeaway: Corporate Documents Will Continue to Be 
Protected 
Critics fear that the First Circuit’s new “for use” test will “open[] the 
door for all litigants to discover documentation relating to a corporation’s 
general litigation reserves and many other historically protected 
documents.”176  A close analysis of Textron’s facts, rather than a blind 
application of the new language, suggests that Textron will not greatly alter 
work-product jurisprudence.  Litigants and corporate counsel who are 
concerned about work-product protection can take certain steps to respond 
to Textron. 
Lawyers outside the First Circuit will be able to distinguish the Textron 
panel’s interpretation of the “because of” test from the one traditionally 
applied in other circuits.177  They should pay special attention to the fact that 
the panel emphasized an alternative holding in Maine and thus did not rely 
on the traditional “because of” test to reach its conclusion.  Litigants 
seeking protection of documents but bringing suit in the First Circuit will 
have to argue for a narrow application of the ruling.  This, however, should 
not be a difficult task.  The litigant must first remind the court that the 
work-product doctrine necessarily balances different policy concerns.  
Although the Textron court was not explicit in its ruling, it is clear that the 
court’s decision was affected by these policy concerns.  The litigant must 
distinguish Textron on the facts and argue that the new documents raise 
different policy concerns that do not require a narrow reading of the work-
product doctrine’s scope.  The lawyer can point to the in-depth policy 
discussion in Textron that weighs in favor of the IRS and establish that tax 
cases are different.  If litigants are trying to protect tax accrual workpapers, 
they will have to seek reversal by demonstrating that the incentives created 
by disclosure are actually different than those imagined by the panel and 
will lead to suboptimal outcomes. 
CONCLUSION 
Very few cases go to trial.  In the cases that do progress that far, 
however, judges make decisions that affect the incentives of lawyers, 
executives, and everyone else.  When a court changes what can be 
discovered during litigation, this decision also changes the incentives for 
those who create the documents in the first place.  The tension between 
transparency and privacy is an unavoidable aspect of the work-product 
doctrine, and balancing the two considerations is difficult.  Textron 
 
176  Henkel, supra note 5, at 237. 
177  But see Brief of Amicus Curiae Council on State Taxation in Support of Petitioner at 11, Textron 
Inc v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3320 (2010) (No. 09-750), 2010 WL 342151 (“Textron’s Narrower Test 
Will Result in the Involuntary Waiver of Otherwise Valid Claims of Work Product Privilege in Many 
Jurisdictions.”). 
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attempted to strike a new balance but did so without explicitly 
acknowledging that it was breaking from precedent.  The exact change in 
incentives under Textron’s ruling is hard to determine.  The overall effect 
on the system is even harder to predict.  Nonetheless, these concerns are 
real and need to be considered by a court prior to deciding privilege cases. 
In Textron, the court attempted to look at the effects of its decision but 
felt constrained by the language of precedent.  Thus, while a correctly 
applied “because of” test would have protected the tax accrual workpapers 
in the case, the court artificially narrowed the test in order to adjust for 
policy concerns not currently incorporated in the jurisprudence.  These 
considerations resulted in an incoherent opinion and an insufficient 
discussion of the full set of policy implications, leaving significant, 
unexplored questions about whether the outcome is good or bad for the 
litigation system.  Without the proper analysis, corporate council and 
taxpayers everywhere simply have to hope that less protection of tax 
accrual workpapers is good for the system.  Though the Supreme Court 
recently denied certiorari in this case, if given another chance to reshape the 
doctrine, the Court should explicitly adopt a new test—the modified 
“because of” test—that would give courts the flexibility to balance, on a 
case-by-case basis, the policy considerations associated with different types 
of documents.  Significantly, this test requires courts faced with dual-
purpose documents to explicitly weigh the incentives created by protecting 
the document when determining whether the work-product privilege should 
apply. 
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